

Message Text

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2175
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AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY LONDON
USNMR SHAPE
USCINCEUR

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 3 MBFR VIENNA 0287

FROM MBFR REP

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PARM, NATO
SUBJ: MBFR: FRG DATA DISAGGREGATION PROPOSAL

1. SUMMARY: THE MAJOR DEFECT OF THE LATEST FRG PROPOSAL, IN DELEGATION'S VIEW, IS ITS FAILURE TO PROVIDE NATIONAL DESIGNATIONS FOR MILITARY PERSONNEL OUTSIDE OF MAJOR UNITS. BECAUSE OF THIS, THE PROPOSAL AS IT STANDS WILL NOT PROVIDE THE INFORMATION NEEDED TO LOCATE THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN EASTERN AND WESTERN FIGURES AND TO PROVIDE THE BASIS FOR A CREDIBLE WESTERN CHALLENGE TO EASTERN DATA. MORE IMPORTANT, IT WILL NOT BE NEGOTIABLE IN ITS PRESENT FORM, WITHOUT NATIONAL DESIGNATION OF PERSONNEL NOT IN MAJOR UNITS. FOR THESE REASONS, EVERY EFFORT SHOULD BE MADE NOW TO CHANGE THE FRG POSITION ON THIS ISSUE.

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2. IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, WE BELIEVE THE MOST EFFECTIVE US POSITION WILL BE FOR THE US TO STATE QUITE DIRECTLY IN THE SPC THAT THE US CONTINUES TO CONSIDER TABLING NATIONAL TOTALS THE MOST LOGICAL NEXT STEP IN THE DATA DISCUSSION. THE US DOES NOT BELIEVE THAT TABLING NATIONAL TOTALS WILL ENDANGER THE WESTERN POSITION ON COLLECTIVITY, THE MOST EFFECTIVE SUPPORT OF WHICH IS THE CLEAR WESTERN DETERMINATION NOT TO ACCEPT NATIONAL

CEILINGS. TABLING NATIONAL TOTALS IS, AT THIS STAGE, THE BEST MEANS OF COMBINING THE WEST'S NEED FOR ADDITIONAL DATA WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF NEGOTIABILITY WITH EAST. FOR THE SAKE OF ALLIANCE COHENSION, THE US IS WILLING AS A COMPROMISE TO ACCEPT THE CONCEPT OF TABLING TOTALS FOR MAJOR UNITS PLUS NATIONALLY DESIGNATED TOTALS FOR PERSONNEL NOT IN UNITS. THE US CONSIDERS THAT THE FRG CONCEPT IN ITS PRESENT FORM WOULD FAIL AND THAT TO ADVANCE IT WOULD DAMAGE THE WESTERN POSITION. END SUMMARY.

3. THE PURPOSE OF PROCEEDING TO A FURTHER DISAGGREGATION OF DATA IS TO ENABLE THE WEST TO IDENTIFY THE REASONS FOR THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN EASTERN AND WESTERN FIGURES ON EASTERN MANPOWER IN THE AREA. SPECIFICALLY, THE WEST WISHES TO OBTAIN FURTHER NUMERICAL DATA FROM THE EAST WHICH CAN BE COMPARED WITH WESTERN DATA HOLDINGS TO DEVELOP A FULL PROFILE OF THE LOCATION AND AMOUNT OF DIVERGENCES BETWEEN EASTERN AND WESTERN DATA. THIS IS ESSENTIAL TO FOCUS FURTHER WESTERN QUESTIONS ON THE AREAS OF GREATEST DISCREPANCY AND TO GIVE THE WEST THE NECESSARY BASIS FOR EFFECTIVELY CHALLENGING THE EASTERN DATA POSITION THAT PARITY IN MILITARY MANPOWER ALREADY EXISTS.

4. EASTERN ACCEPTANCE OF THE PRESENT GERMAN PROPOSAL WOULD ENABLE THE WEST TO OBTAIN A PICTURE OF THE LOCATION AND EXTENT OF DIVERGENCE BETWEEN WESTERN AND EASTERN DATA ON PACT FORCES AS REGARDS MAJOR UNITS. THIS WOULD BE A GAIN AS COMPARED WITH THE PRESENT SITUATION.

5. BUT THE GERMAN PROPOSAL WOULD OBLIGE THE WEST TO STOP AT THIS POINT. WITHOUT NATIONAL DESIGNATION OF REAR ECHELON
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PERSONNEL, THE WESTERN PROFILE OF THE DISCREPANCY WILL REMAIN INCOMPLETE. IT WILL BE IMPOSSIBLE TO OBTAIN A FULL PICTURE AS TO THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE DISCREPANCY EITHER AMONG THE NATIONAL COMPONENTS OF EASTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS OR WITHIN THE FORCES OF THE INDIVIDUAL EASTERN PARTICIPANTS.

6. A FURTHER CONSEQUENCE OF THE GERMAN PROPOSAL IS THAT THE WEST MIGHT IN PRACTICE HAVE TO DROP ITS CHALLENGE TO A MAJOR PART OF THE DISPARITY. THE LIMITED EXCHANGE OF FIGURES PROPOSED BY THE FRG WOULD SHOW THAT THERE IS A SUBSTANTIAL DISCREPANCY BETWEEN THE NATO AND EASTERN FIGURES FOR OVERALL REAR ECHELON EASTERN MANPOWER, POSSIBLY ACCOUNTING FOR MOST OF THE OVERALL DISCREPANCY, FOR THE FOLLOWING REASONS:

A. EASTERN REPRESENTATIVES HAVE INDICATED THAT THE BULK OF THE DISCREPANCY IS IN NSWP MANPOWER, A SIZEABLE PORTION OF WHICH--MUCH MORE THAN SOVIET--IS IN REAR ECHELON COMPONENTS.

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FROM MBFR REP

B. IT IS PRECISELY IN THESE REAR ECHELON CATEGORIES THAT MOST
OF THE PERSONNEL ARE TO BE FOUND WHO WOULD HAVE BEEN EXCLUDED
FROM THE COUNT ACCORDING TO THE COUNTING RULES PROPOSED BY THE
EAST IN THE SPRING OF 1976.

C. THE REAR ECHELON COMPONENTS CONSTITUTE THE LESS VISIBLE
ELEMENTS OF THE EASTERN FORCES. IF THE EAST HAS DELIBERATELY
EXCLUDED MILITARY PERSONNEL FROM ITS OVERALL FIGURES, IT IS
LIKELY THAT THE EAST PERCEIVED THIS CATEGORY AS OFFERING THE
BEST PROSPECTS FOR SUCCESSFULLY CONCEALING THE FACT THAT
EXCLUSIONS HAD BEEN MADE.

7. THUS, FOR THE WEST TO PUT FORWARD THE FRG CONCEPT IN ITS
PRESENT FORM COULD SUGGEST WESTERN WILLINGNESS TO RELINQUISH
BY DEFAULT, AND WITHOUT COMPENSATION FROM THE EAST, A LARGE
PORTION OF THE ASYMMETRICAL EASTERN REDUCTIONS THE WEST IS
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SEEKING UNDER THE COMMON CEILING CONCEPT AND THUS DAMAGE THE

WESTERN CASE FOR ASYMMETRICAL EASTERN REDUCTIONS.

8. BUT BY FAR THE MOST IMPORTANT ARGUMENT AGAINST THE CURRENT FRG PROPOSAL IS THAT THE EAST WILL ALMOST CERTAINLY REJECT IT. ADVANCING IT WILL DAMAGE THE WESTERN POSITION, LEAVING THE DATA

DISCUSSION BLOCKED WITH THE ONUS FOR THE IMPASSE ON THE WEST.

9. THE EAST WOULD HAVE A GOOD CASE FOR REJECTING THE FRG PROPOSAL. BOTH SIDES ARE AGREED ON THE NEED FOR IDENTIFYING THE SOURCES OF THE DISCREPANCY. BECAUSE THE EAST, LIKE THE WEST ORGANIZES ITS FORCES ON A NATIONAL BASIS AND BECAUSE IT PRESUMABLY ALSO ORGANIZES ITS INFORMATION ON MILITARY FORCES ON A NATIONAL BASIS, THE EAST CAN MAKE A STRONG CASE THAT DISAGGREGATION ON A NATIONAL BASIS IS THE NEXT LOGICAL STEP IN THE DATA DISCUSSION. THE WEST CANNOT CREDIBLY DENY THE LOGIC OF THIS ARGUMENT, WHICH IS ACCEPTED BY MOST OF THE PARTICIPATING ALLIES.

10. ACCORDINGLY, IF THE WEST WISHES TO PROPOSE SOME DIFFERENT STEP, IT WILL HAVE TO DEMONSTRATE TO THE EAST THAT ANY ALTERNATE DISAGGREGATION SCHEME IT MAY PROPOSE WILL MAKE AVAILABLE THE INFORMATION IT WOULD HAVE RECEIVED THROUGH TABLING NATIONAL TOTALS AND THAT INFORMATION ON NATIONAL TOTALS WILL NOT BE SUFFICIENT BY ITSELF BUT WILL NEED TO BE SUPPLEMENTED BY FURTHER DISAGGREGATED DATA. THIS CANNOT BE DONE UNDER THE PRESENT GERMAN PROPOSAL.

11. MOREOVER, THE EAST HAS TRADITIONALLY, AND SPECIFICALLY IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS, BEEN UNWILLING TO DISCLOSE MILITARY INFORMATION UNLESS IT WAS CLEARLY REQUIRED TO SOLVE A SPECIFIC NEGOTIATING PROBLEM AND UNBLOCK AN IMPASSE. AGAINST THIS BACKGROUND, IT IS ALREADY A POTENTIAL IMPORTANT WESTERN GAIN THAT THE EAST IS WILLING TO DISAGGREGATE ITS ORIGINAL DATA AND TO TABLE DATA ON ITS NATIONAL FORCES. THIS WILLINGNESS SHOULD NOT BE JEOPARDIZED.

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12. DESPITE THIS, THE FRG PROPOSAL IN ITS PRESENT FORM ASKS THE EAST, AGAINST A KNOWN BACKGROUND OF EASTERN UNWILLINGNESS TO DISCUSS MILITARY DATA, TO TABLE INFORMATION WHICH THE EAST MAY REGARD AS SENSITIVE INSTEAD OF THE INFORMATION IT HAS OFFERED TO TABLE AND TO DO SO, MOREOVER, WITHOUT OBTAINING THE INFORMATION THE EAST HAS REQUESTED FROM THE WEST.

13. NOT ONLY IS SUCH A PROPOSAL VIRTUALLY CERTAIN TO BE REJECTED, BUT ALSO THE EASTERN REJECTION WOULD BLOCK THE DATA DISCUSSION IN A WAY THAT WOULD BE EXTREMELY DAMAGING TO THE WEST. HIGHLIGHTING THE WEST'S AVERSION TO NATIONAL TOTALS WILL PREVENT THE DATA DISCUSSION FROM ADVANCING BEYOND THIS ISSUE,

I.E., WHETHER OR NOT NATIONAL TOTALS SHOULD BE TABLED, RATHER THAN FOCUSING IT ON THE ISSUE OF WHETHER OR NOT THE DISCUSSION SHOULD GO BEYOND NATIONAL TOTALS. THIS SITUATION WILL PLACE THE WEST AT A SEVERE DISADVANTAGE.

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FROM MBFR REP

14. WHEN ASKED BY THE EAST WHY IT OPPOSES TABLING NATIONAL TOTALS, THE WEST WILL BE REQUIRED TO ANSWER THAT TABLING NATIONAL TOTALS WOULD DAMAGE THE WESTERN POSITION--THEREBY ESTABLISHING THE VERY CONNECTION BETWEEN THE WESTERN NEGOTIATING POSITION AND THE DATA DISCUSSION WE HAVE SO FAR SOUGHT TO AVOID AND INFUSING THE ENTIRE DATA DISCUSSION WITH SIGNIFICANCE FOR THE GENERAL NEGOTIATING POSITIONS OF EACH SIDE. BOTH SIDES WOULD THEN BE OBLIGED TO CONSIDER EACH MOVE IN THE DATA DISCUSSION FROM THE VIEWPOINT OF POSSIBLE PREJUDICE TO ALL ASPECTS OF ITS NEGOTIATING POSITION (E.G. WITHDRAWAL BY UNITS, COLLECTIVITY, ETC.). NO EFFECTIVE DATA DISCUSSION WOULD BE POSSIBLE UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES.

15. FOR THE WEST TO TAKE SUCH AN EXTREME POSITION IN THE DATA DISCUSSION, NAMELY, TO REFUSE UNDER ALL CIRCUMSTANCES, DESPITE EASTERN WILLINGNESS TO AGREE TO BROAD DISCLAIMERS, BOTH TO
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TABLE NATIONAL DATA (EXCEPT FOR US DATA) AND TO TABLE DATA WHICH COULD BE COMBINED TO PRODUCE NATIONAL DATA, COULD MAKE IT APPEAR TO THE EAST EVEN LESS PROBABLE THAT THE WESTERN EUROPEAN PARTICIPANTS WILL REDUCE THEIR FORCES. THIS WOULD DECREASE POSSIBLE EASTERN WILLINGNESS TO SHOW FLEXIBILITY ON NON-DATA-RELATED NEGOTIATING TOPICS.

16. TABLING THE FRG PROPOSAL WOULD FOCUS EAST/WEST DEBATE ON THE ISSUE OF NATIONAL TOTALS AND THEIR RELATIONSHIP TO COLLECTIVE CEILINGS. SUCH A FOCUS IS LIKELY TO DRAMATIZE THE ISSUE OF COLLECTIVE CEILINGS. THIS COULD CAUSE THE EAST TO ASSUME IT COULD OBTAIN MAJOR WESTERN CONCESSIONS IN RETURN FOR POSSIBLE AGREEMENT TO COLLECTIVITY.

17. THE PRACTICAL RESULT WILL BE TO BRING THE DATA DISCUSSION TO A HALT, LEAVING THE INITIATIVE WITH THE EAST AND THE LEAVING EAST'S DATA WITHOUT EFFECTIVE CHALLENGE. UNDER THOSE CIRCUMSTANCES THE WEST WOULD BE FACED WITH CHOOSING BETWEEN ACCEPTING EASTERN DATA, ATTEMPTING TO FIND A SOLUTION THAT BY-PASSED THE NEED FOR ANY AGREEMENT ON DATA, OR RECONSIDERING ITS POSITION NOT TO TABLE NATIONAL TOTALS UNDER CIRCUMSTANCES THAT WOULD MAKE THIS CHANGE FAR MORE DIFFICULT. IN A SITUATION WHERE THE ISSUE OF TABLING NATIONAL TOTALS HAD BECOME THE FOCUS OF CONTROVERSY AND HAD ATTRACTED POLITICAL ATTENTION IN THE FRG, THERE WOULD BE ALMOST NO CHANCE OF BRINGING FOREIGN MINISTER GENSCHER TO CHANGE HIS POSITION.

18. THIS ANALYSIS MAKES CLEAR THAT THE US SHOULD MAKE EVERY EFFORT NOW IN THE SPC TO CHANGE THE FRG POSITION. RESOR

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